pam: update to 1.3.0

4 files changed, 7 insertions, 120 deletions

diff --git a/abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD b/abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD
index 9290c1e..3279743 100644
--- a/abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD
+++ b/abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 # Contributor: judd <jvinet@zeroflux.org>
 
 pkgname=pam
-pkgver=1.2.1
+pkgver=1.3.0
 pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) library"
 arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ backup=(etc/security/{access.conf,group.conf,limits.conf,namespace.conf,namespac
 source=(http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.bz2
         https://sources.archlinux.org/other/pam_unix2/pam_unix2-2.9.1.tar.bz2
         pam_unix2-glibc216.patch)
-md5sums=('9dc53067556d2dd567808fd509519dd6'
+md5sums=('da4b2289b7cfb19583d54e9eaaef1c3a'
          'da6a46e5f8cd3eaa7cbc4fc3a7e2b555'
          'dac109f68e04a4df37575fda6001ea17')
 
@@ -53,16 +53,6 @@ package() {
   cd $srcdir/pam_unix2-2.9.1
   make DESTDIR=$pkgdir install
 
-  # add the realtime permissions for audio users
-  sed -i 's|# End of file||' $pkgdir/etc/security/limits.conf
-  cat >>$pkgdir/etc/security/limits.conf <<_EOT
-*               -       rtprio          0
-*               -       nice            0
-@audio          -       rtprio          65
-@audio          -       nice           -10
-@audio          -       memlock         40000
-_EOT
-
   # fix some missing symlinks from old pam for compatibility
   cd $pkgdir/usr/lib/security
   ln -s pam_unix.so pam_unix_acct.so
@@ -75,4 +65,8 @@ _EOT
   # remove doc which is not used anymore
   # FS #40749
   rm $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/Linux-PAM/sag-pam_userdb.html
+
+  # disable coredumps
+  sed -i 's|# End of file||' $pkgdir/etc/security/limits.conf
+  echo "* hard core 0" >> $pkgdir/etc/security/limits.conf
 }
diff --git a/abs/core/pam/__changelog b/abs/core/pam/__changelog
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f2315e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/abs/core/pam/__changelog
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+PKGBUILD: disable coredumps in limits.conf
diff --git a/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch b/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 96fa916..0000000
--- a/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 57a1e2b274d0a6376d92ada9926e5c5741e7da20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
-Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 22:18:32 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] pam_userdb: fix password hash comparison
-
-Starting with commit Linux-PAM-0-77-28-g0b3e583 that introduced hashed
-passwords support in pam_userdb, hashes are compared case-insensitively.
-This bug leads to accepting hashes for completely different passwords in
-addition to those that should be accepted.
-
-Additionally, commit Linux-PAM-1_1_6-13-ge2a8187 that added support for
-modern password hashes with different lengths and settings, did not
-update the hash comparison accordingly, which leads to accepting
-computed hashes longer than stored hashes when the latter is a prefix
-of the former.
-
-* modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c (user_lookup): Reject the computed
-hash whose length differs from the stored hash length.
-Compare computed and stored hashes case-sensitively.
-Fixes CVE-2013-7041.
-
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/731368
----
- modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c | 9 ++++++---
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
-index de8b5b1..ff040e6 100644
---- a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
-+++ b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
-@@ -222,12 +222,15 @@ user_lookup (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *database, const char *cryptmode,
- 	  } else {
- 	    cryptpw = crypt (pass, data.dptr);
- 
--	    if (cryptpw) {
--	      compare = strncasecmp (data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize);
-+	    if (cryptpw && strlen(cryptpw) == (size_t)data.dsize) {
-+	      compare = memcmp(data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize);
- 	    } else {
- 	      compare = -2;
- 	      if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
--		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL");
-+		if (cryptpw)
-+		  pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "lengths of computed and stored hashes differ");
-+		else
-+		  pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL");
- 	      }
- 	    };
- 
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch b/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f2aa2de..0000000
--- a/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
-Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:17:23 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] pam_timestamp: fix potential directory traversal issue
- (ticket #27)
-
-pam_timestamp uses values of PAM_RUSER and PAM_TTY as components of
-the timestamp pathname it creates, so extra care should be taken to
-avoid potential directory traversal issues.
-
-* modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c (check_tty): Treat
-"." and ".." tty values as invalid.
-(get_ruser): Treat "." and ".." ruser values, as well as any ruser
-value containing '/', as invalid.
-
-Fixes CVE-2014-2583.
-
-Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
----
- modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
-index 5193733..b3f08b1 100644
---- a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
-+++ b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ check_tty(const char *tty)
- 		tty = strrchr(tty, '/') + 1;
- 	}
- 	/* Make sure the tty wasn't actually a directory (no basename). */
--	if (strlen(tty) == 0) {
-+	if (!strlen(tty) || !strcmp(tty, ".") || !strcmp(tty, "..")) {
- 		return NULL;
- 	}
- 	return tty;
-@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *ruserbuf, size_t ruserbuflen)
- 		if (pwd != NULL) {
- 			ruser = pwd->pw_name;
- 		}
-+	} else {
-+		/*
-+		 * This ruser is used by format_timestamp_name as a component
-+		 * of constructed timestamp pathname, so ".", "..", and '/'
-+		 * are disallowed to avoid potential path traversal issues.
-+		 */
-+		if (!strcmp(ruser, ".") ||
-+		    !strcmp(ruser, "..") ||
-+		    strchr(ruser, '/')) {
-+			ruser = NULL;
-+		}
- 	}
- 	if (ruser == NULL || strlen(ruser) >= ruserbuflen) {
- 		*ruserbuf = '\0';
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-