krb5, libatasmart, libcap, ligbusb, linl, libsasl, lighttpd:

update binary path to /usr/bin
refs #961

2 files changed, 371 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD b/abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD
index 99d938b..b6dbd5a 100644
--- a/abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD
+++ b/abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,18 +1,30 @@
-#$Id: PKGBUILD 158556 2012-05-04 23:56:45Z allan $
+#$Id: PKGBUILD 203064 2014-01-03 09:18:41Z allan $
 # Maintainer: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
 # Contributor: Hugo Doria <hugo@archlinux.org>
 
 pkgname=libcap
-pkgver=2.22
-pkgrel=3
+pkgver=2.23
+pkgrel=2
 pkgdesc="POSIX 1003.1e capabilities"
 arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
 url="http://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/"
 license=('GPL2')
 depends=('glibc' 'attr')
-source=(ftp://ftp.archlinux.org/other/${pkgname}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz{,.asc})
-md5sums=('b4896816b626bea445f0b3849bdd4077'
-         '9d0983e25e5a251d098507f9561d2b27')
+options=('!staticlibs')
+source=(https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/libcap2/libcap-2.23.tar.xz
+        libcap-2.23-header.patch)
+
+prepare() {
+  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
+
+  # install into /usr/bin
+  sed -i "/SBINDIR/s#sbin#bin#" Make.Rules
+
+  # fix header path issues
+  patch -p1 -i $srcdir/libcap-2.23-header.patch
+  # and fix the build with that patch
+  sed -i "s#uapi/##" libcap/Makefile
+}
 
 build() {
   cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
@@ -21,11 +33,10 @@ build() {
 
 package() {
   cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-  make prefix=/usr DESTDIR=${pkgdir} RAISE_SETFCAP=no install
-  
-  chmod 755 ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libcap.so.${pkgver}
-  rm ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libcap.a
+  make prefix=/usr lib=/lib DESTDIR=${pkgdir} RAISE_SETFCAP=no install
   
   install -Dm644 pam_cap/capability.conf \
     $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$pkgname/capability.conf.example
 }
+md5sums=('09a185e4b0aa8a81a51c1e4d0eba7db0'
+         '945984c4bf5e601c24a7c80f001fb2c6')
diff --git a/abs/core/libcap/libcap-2.23-header.patch b/abs/core/libcap/libcap-2.23-header.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74c45e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/abs/core/libcap/libcap-2.23-header.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+From c3290668646b767058e55b29f7b8f4be4af2e660 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew G Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 01:56:31 +0000
+Subject: Fix up the uapi/linux include scheme.
+
+In adopting this uapi header file (without kernel internals), I previously
+messed up on the apparent location of the files. Thanks to Tom Gundersen for
+the clarification. Also, delete the non-uapi copies of things since they
+are no longer needed to build the library and tools.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew G Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
+---
+diff --git a/Make.Rules b/Make.Rules
+index 9ca6c89..5b58c59 100644
+--- a/Make.Rules
++++ b/Make.Rules
+@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ MINOR=23
+ 
+ # Compilation specifics
+ 
+-KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include
+-IPATH += -fPIC -I$(topdir)/libcap/include -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS)
++KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include/uapi
++IPATH += -fPIC -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) -I$(topdir)/libcap/include
+ 
+ CC := gcc
+ CFLAGS := -O2 -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
+diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
+deleted file mode 100644
+index a6ee1f9..0000000
+--- a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
+-/*
+- * This is <linux/capability.h>
+- *
+- * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
+- * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
+- * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
+- *
+- * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
+- *
+- * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
+- */
+-#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+-#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+-
+-#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
+-
+-
+-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
+-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
+-
+-extern int file_caps_enabled;
+-
+-typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
+-	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
+-} kernel_cap_t;
+-
+-/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
+-struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
+-	__u32 magic_etc;
+-	kernel_cap_t permitted;
+-	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
+-};
+-
+-#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
+-#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
+-
+-
+-struct file;
+-struct inode;
+-struct dentry;
+-struct user_namespace;
+-
+-struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
+-
+-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
+-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
+-
+-/*
+- * Internal kernel functions only
+- */
+-
+-#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
+-	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
+-
+-/*
+- * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
+- *
+- * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
+- * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
+- *
+- * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
+- *
+- * We could also define fsmask as follows:
+- *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
+- *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
+- */
+-
+-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
+-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
+-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
+-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
+-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
+-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
+-
+-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+-
+-#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
+-# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
+-#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
+-
+-# define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
+-# define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
+-# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
+-				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
+-				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+-# define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
+-				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
+-				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+-
+-#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
+-
+-# define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
+-
+-#define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+-#define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+-#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+-
+-#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP)                                    \
+-do {                                                                \
+-	unsigned __capi;                                            \
+-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
+-		c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi];     \
+-	}                                                           \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP)                                       \
+-do {                                                                \
+-	unsigned __capi;                                            \
+-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
+-		c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi];                   \
+-	}                                                           \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
+-				       const kernel_cap_t b)
+-{
+-	kernel_cap_t dest;
+-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
+-	return dest;
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
+-					 const kernel_cap_t b)
+-{
+-	kernel_cap_t dest;
+-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
+-	return dest;
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
+-				    const kernel_cap_t drop)
+-{
+-	kernel_cap_t dest;
+-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
+-	return dest;
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
+-{
+-	kernel_cap_t dest;
+-	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
+-	return dest;
+-}
+-
+-static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
+-{
+-	unsigned __capi;
+-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
+-		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
+-			return 0;
+-	}
+-	return 1;
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
+- * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
+- *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
+- * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
+- *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
+- */
+-static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
+-{
+-	kernel_cap_t dest;
+-	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
+-	return cap_isclear(dest);
+-}
+-
+-/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
+-
+-static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
+-{
+-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+-	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
+-{
+-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+-	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
+-					    const kernel_cap_t permitted)
+-{
+-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+-	return cap_combine(a,
+-			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
+-{
+-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
+-	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
+-					      const kernel_cap_t permitted)
+-{
+-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
+-	return cap_combine(a,
+-			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
+-}
+-
+-extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+-extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+-			      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+-extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+-extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+-				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+-extern bool capable(int cap);
+-extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+-extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+-extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+-
+-/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
+-extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
+-
+-#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
+diff --git a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
+index 56fc7fd..64ac50e 100644
+--- a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
++++ b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #ifndef __user
+ #define __user
+ #endif
+-#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
+ #include <linux/xattr.h>
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+index a3baeb2..289760f 100644
+--- a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h
++++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+@@ -102,4 +102,51 @@
+ 
+ #define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34
+ 
++/*
++ * Tune up process memory map specifics.
++ */
++#define PR_SET_MM		35
++# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE		1
++# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE		2
++# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA		3
++# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA		4
++# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK		5
++# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK		6
++# define PR_SET_MM_BRK			7
++# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START		8
++# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END		9
++# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START		10
++# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END		11
++# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV			12
++# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE		13
++
++/*
++ * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task.
++ * A value of 0 mean "no process".
++ */
++#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
++# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1)
++
++#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER	36
++#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER	37
++
++/*
++ * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e.
++ * execve) will either fail or not grant them.  This affects suid/sgid,
++ * file capabilities, and LSMs.
++ *
++ * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid,
++ * capset, etc.) will still work.  Drop those privileges if you want them gone.
++ *
++ * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege.  So, for example,
++ * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
++ * in execve returning -EPERM.
++ *
++ * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
++ */
++#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	38
++#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	39
++
++#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS	40
++
+ #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
+diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
+index 3340617..985aac9 100644
+--- a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h
++++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
+@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
+-#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
+-#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
++#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
++#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
+ 
+ /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
+    whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
+    setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
+    changed from user-level. */
+ #define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X))
+-#ifdef __KERNEL__
+-#define issecure(X)		(issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
+-#endif
+ 
+ #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
+ 
+@@ -51,4 +48,4 @@
+ 				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+ #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
+ 
+-#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
++#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
+--
+cgit v0.9.2