diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers')
-rw-r--r-- | abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD | 35 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch | 1025 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 | 28 |
7 files changed, 1145 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5612e23 --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +# $Id: PKGBUILD 356 2008-04-18 22:56:27Z aaron $ +# Maintainer: judd <jvinet@zeroflux.org> +pkgname=tcp_wrappers +pkgver=7.6 +pkgrel=17 +pkgdesc="Monitors and Controls incoming TCP connections" +arch=(i686 x86_64) +url="ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html" +license=('custom') +groups=('base') +backup=(etc/hosts.allow etc/hosts.deny) +depends=('bash' 'glibc') +source=(ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/${pkgname}_$pkgver.tar.gz \ + hosts.allow hosts.deny try-from.8 safe_finger.8 gcc340.patch \ + shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch) +md5sums=('e6fa25f71226d090f34de3f6b122fb5a' '32cfeeed797161034f62bb45f3167baa'\ + 'a0ee30f6aeaca241c4d44f7c177eca6b' '4a8f40f9a69f0848df92b232072e8561'\ + '1a6d7b11abb1fd69ace775d02a1c72cf' '19c3badd4fbee547eb9de61ed93691af'\ + 'e39dc7e099b741b6d2b1799a56ab77af') + +build() { + cd $startdir/src/${pkgname}_$pkgver + patch -Np1 -i ../gcc340.patch || return 1 + patch -Np1 -i ../shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch || return 1 + make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin STYLE=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED linux || return 1 + # dumb makefile + mkdir -p $startdir/pkg/usr/{include,lib,sbin} + mkdir -p $startdir/pkg/usr/share/man/man{3,5,8} + make DESTDIR=$startdir/pkg install + install -D -m644 ../hosts.allow $startdir/pkg/etc/hosts.allow + install -D -m644 ../hosts.deny $startdir/pkg/etc/hosts.deny + # install license + mkdir -p $startdir/pkg/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname + install -m644 DISCLAIMER $startdir/pkg/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/license.txt +} diff --git a/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0a2750 --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6-orig/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6-orig/scaffold.c 1997-03-21 10:27:24.000000000 -0800 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 2004-05-07 19:44:50.000000000 -0700 +@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ + #define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ + #endif + +-extern char *malloc(); + + /* Application-specific. */ + diff --git a/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e5c035d --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# +# /etc/hosts.allow +# + +# End of file diff --git a/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efcce18 --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# +# /etc/hosts.deny +# + +ALL: ALL: DENY + +# End of file diff --git a/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..875616b --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.SH NAME +safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff +from finger servers +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B safe_finger [finger_options] +.SH DESCRIPTION +The +.B safe_finger +command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this +program for automatic reverse finger probes from the +.B tcp_wrapper +.B (tcpd) +, not the raw finger command. The +.B safe_finger +command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root +privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH +environment. +.B safe_finger +will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some +finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in +the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere +on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps +sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines. +The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged. +.B safe_finger +takes care of all this badness. +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR hosts_access (5), +.BR hosts_options (5), +.BR tcpd (8) +.SH AUTHOR +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + diff --git a/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89b0b0c --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1025 @@ +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile 1997-03-21 12:27:21.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile 2002-07-15 16:07:21.000000000 -0500 +@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ ++GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h) ++ + # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20 + ++# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable ++HOSTNAME = ++ + what: + @echo + @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:" +@@ -19,7 +24,7 @@ + @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)" + @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543" + @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix" +- @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" ++ @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" + @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4" + @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" + @echo " uts215 uxp" +@@ -43,8 +48,8 @@ + # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx + #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc + # +-# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX +-#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin ++# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux ++REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin + # + # BSD 4.4 + #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec +@@ -141,10 +146,21 @@ + LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ + EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all + ++ifneq ($(GLIBC),0) ++MYLIB=-lnsl ++endif ++ + linux: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ +- LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ +- NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all ++ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ ++ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" ++ ++gnu: ++ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ ++ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ ++ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" + + # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. + hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: +@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ + # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module + # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv(). + +-AUX_OBJ= setenv.o ++#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o + #AUX_OBJ= environ.o + #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o + +@@ -454,7 +470,8 @@ + # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work + # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions. + +-BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK ++BUGS = ++#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK + #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG + #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG + +@@ -464,7 +481,7 @@ + # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following + # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control. + # +-#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP ++NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP + + ############################################################### + # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog() +@@ -491,7 +508,7 @@ + # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions + # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn). + # +-#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. ++STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. + + ################################################################ + # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records +@@ -514,7 +531,7 @@ + # + # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file. + +-FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use ++FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use + + # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged. + +@@ -610,7 +627,7 @@ + # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname + # lookups altogether, see the next section. + +-PARANOID= -DPARANOID ++#PARANOID= -DPARANOID + + ######################################## + # Optional: turning off hostname lookups +@@ -623,7 +640,7 @@ + # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid + # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition. + +-HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME ++#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME + + ############################################# + # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking +@@ -649,28 +666,46 @@ + # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives, + # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details. + # +-# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS ++KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS + + ## End configuration options + ############################ + + # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs. + ++CC = gcc + SHELL = /bin/sh +-.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c ++.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c ++ ++SOMAJOR = 0 ++SOMINOR = 7.6 ++ ++LIB = libwrap.a ++SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR) ++SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) ++SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so ++SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap + +-CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ ++shared/%.o: %.c ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ ++ ++CFLAGS = -O2 -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ + $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \ + -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \ + -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \ + $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \ + $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME) + ++SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS) ++SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT ++ + LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \ + hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \ + $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \ + update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o + ++SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ)); ++ + FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o + + KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \ +@@ -684,46 +719,80 @@ + refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \ + scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS + +-LIB = libwrap.a +- +-all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk ++all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB) + + # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed. + + config-check: + @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; } +- @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ +- if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ +- then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ +- else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \ ++ @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \ ++ if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \ ++ then rm cflags.new ; \ ++ else mv cflags.new cflags ; \ + fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null ++ @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi + + $(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ) + rm -f $(LIB) + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ) + -$(RANLIB) $(LIB) + +-tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ) ++ rm -f $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ) ++ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ) ++ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO) ++ ++tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) + +-miscd: miscd.o $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) + +-safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) + + TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o + +-tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) + +-try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) + + TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o + +-tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) ++ ++install: install-lib install-bin install-dev ++ ++install-lib: ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ ++ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ++ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO)) ++ ++install-bin: ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 try-from.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 safe_finger.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ ++ ++install-dev: ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/ ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3 ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3 ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3 + + shar: $(KIT) + @shar $(KIT) +@@ -739,7 +808,8 @@ + + clean: + rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \ +- cflags ++ cflags libwrap*.so* ++ rm -rf shared + + tidy: clean + chmod -R a+r . +@@ -885,5 +955,6 @@ + update.o: mystdarg.h + update.o: tcpd.h + vfprintf.o: cflags ++weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h + workarounds.o: cflags + workarounds.o: tcpd.h +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c 1997-04-07 19:29:19.000000000 -0500 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -35,7 +35,12 @@ + #ifdef IP_OPTIONS + unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp; + char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) + int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ ++ size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf); ++ int ipproto; ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ + struct protoent *ip; + int fd = request->fd; + unsigned int opt; +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 1996-02-11 10:01:27.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ + hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library + .SH SYNOPSIS + .nf +-#include "tcpd.h" ++#include <tcpd.h> + + extern int allow_severity; + extern int deny_severity; +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 1995-01-30 12:51:47.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ + impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a + quick introduction. + .PP +-An extended version of the access control language is described in the +-\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at +-program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. ++The extended version of the access control language is described in the ++\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes ++the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR + .PP + In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a + network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ + character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are + easier to edit. + .IP \(bu +-Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored. ++Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored. + This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables + are easier to read. + .IP \(bu +@@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ + .SH PATTERNS + The access control language implements the following patterns: + .IP \(bu +-A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if ++A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if + the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For +-example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name +-`wzv.win.tue.nl\'. ++example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name ++`wzv.win.tue.nl'. + .IP \(bu +-A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if ++A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if + its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the +-pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the ++pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the + Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x). + .IP \(bu +-A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS ++A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS + (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host + member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported + for daemon process names or for client user names. + .IP \(bu +-An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a +-`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the +-bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask +-pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the +-range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. ++An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a ++`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the ++bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask ++pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the ++range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'. ++.IP \(bu ++A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file ++name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name ++or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is ++zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns ++separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere ++a host name or address pattern can be used. + .SH WILDCARDS + The access control language supports explicit wildcards: + .IP ALL +@@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ + .ne 6 + .SH OPERATORS + .IP EXCEPT +-Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct ++Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct + matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches + \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in + client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control +-language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\' +-would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'. ++language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c' ++would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'. + .br + .ne 6 + .SH SHELL COMMANDS + If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that + command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section). + The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard +-input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\' ++input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&' + at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has + completed. + .PP +@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ + .IP %u + The client user name (or "unknown"). + .IP %% +-Expands to a single `%\' character. ++Expands to a single `%' character. + .PP + Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by + underscores. +@@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ + less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the + client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much + harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that +-the client\'s IDENT server is lying. ++the client's IDENT server is lying. + .PP +-Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. ++Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services. + .SH EXAMPLES + The language is flexible enough that different types of access control + policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language +@@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ + .br + ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu + .PP +-The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\' ++The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.' + in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP + netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the + \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of +@@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ + /etc/hosts.deny: + .in +3 + .nf +-in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ +- /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) & ++in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ ++ /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) & + .fi + .PP + The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be +@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ + capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not + terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter> + expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails +-that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. ++that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. + .SH FILES + .na + .nf +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 1997-02-11 19:13:23.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -240,6 +240,26 @@ + } + } + ++/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */ ++ ++static int hostfile_match(path, host) ++char *path; ++struct hosts_info *host; ++{ ++ char tok[BUFSIZ]; ++ int match = NO; ++ FILE *fp; ++ ++ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { ++ while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host))) ++ /* void */ ; ++ fclose(fp); ++ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { ++ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path); ++ } ++ return (match); ++} ++ + /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */ + + static int host_match(tok, host) +@@ -267,6 +287,8 @@ + tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */ + return (NO); + #endif ++ } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */ ++ return (hostfile_match(tok, host)); + } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */ + char *name = eval_hostname(host); + return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 1994-12-28 10:42:29.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ + Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after + performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5) + manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr +-connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the ++connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the + conversation with the client host. Example: + .sp + .nf + .ti +3 +-spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) & ++spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) & + .fi + .sp + executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c 1996-02-11 10:01:32.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ + #ifdef LOG_CRON + "cron", LOG_CRON, + #endif ++#ifdef LOG_FTP ++ "ftp", LOG_FTP, ++#endif + #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0 + "local0", LOG_LOCAL0, + #endif +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c 1994-12-28 10:42:37.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ + #include <string.h> + + extern int errno; +-#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED ++#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) + extern char *sys_errlist[]; + extern int sys_nerr; + #endif +@@ -29,11 +29,15 @@ + + while (*bp = *cp) + if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') { ++#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR ++ strcpy(bp, strerror(errno)); ++#else + if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) { + strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]); + } else { + sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno); + } ++#endif + bp += strlen(bp); + cp += 2; + } else { +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c 1995-01-02 09:11:34.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ + + int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */ + +-static jmp_buf timebuf; ++static sigjmp_buf timebuf; + + /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */ + +@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ + static void timeout(sig) + int sig; + { +- longjmp(timebuf, sig); ++ siglongjmp(timebuf, sig); + } + + /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ +@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ + * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. + */ + +- if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { ++ if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) { + signal(SIGALRM, timeout); + alarm(rfc931_timeout); + +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ ++.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" ++.SH NAME ++safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff ++from finger servers ++.SH SYNOPSIS ++.B safe_finger [finger_options] ++.SH DESCRIPTION ++The ++.B safe_finger ++command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this ++program for automatic reverse finger probes from the ++.B tcp_wrapper ++.B (tcpd) ++, not the raw finger command. The ++.B safe_finger ++command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root ++privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH ++environment. ++.B safe_finger ++will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some ++finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in ++the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere ++on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps ++sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines. ++The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged. ++.B safe_finger ++takes care of all this badness. ++.SH SEE ALSO ++.BR hosts_access (5), ++.BR hosts_options (5), ++.BR tcpd (8) ++.SH AUTHOR ++Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. ++ +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c 1994-12-28 10:42:42.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -26,21 +26,24 @@ + #include <stdio.h> + #include <ctype.h> + #include <pwd.h> ++#include <syslog.h> + + extern void exit(); + + /* Local stuff */ + +-char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin"; ++char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin"; + + #define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ + #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ + #define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */ + #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */ + #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */ +-#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */ ++#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */ + + int finger_pid; ++int allow_severity = SEVERITY; ++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; + + void cleanup(sig) + int sig; +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 1997-03-21 12:27:24.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -180,10 +180,12 @@ + + /* ARGSUSED */ + +-void rfc931(request) +-struct request_info *request; ++void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) ++struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; ++struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; ++char *dest; + { +- strcpy(request->user, unknown); ++ strcpy(dest, unknown); + } + + /* check_path - examine accessibility */ +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c 1997-03-21 12:27:25.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ + { + static struct sockaddr_in client; + static struct sockaddr_in server; ++#if !defined (__GLIBC__) + int len; ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ ++ size_t len; ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int fd = request->fd; + +@@ -224,7 +228,11 @@ + { + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + struct sockaddr_in sin; ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) + int size = sizeof(sin); ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ ++ size_t size = sizeof(sin); ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ + + /* + * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 1996-02-21 09:39:16.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ + .PP + The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some + systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have +-no `in.\' prefix to their name. ++no `in.' prefix to their name. + .SH EXAMPLE 2 + This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons + are left in their original place. +@@ -110,26 +110,26 @@ + becomes: + .sp + .ti +5 +-finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd ++finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd + .sp + .fi + .PP + The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some + systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the +-daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid ++daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid + field in the inetd configuration file. + .PP + Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be +-covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) ++covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) + process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to +-execute the `inetimp\' command. ++execute the `inetimp' command. + .SH EXAMPLE 3 + In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" + or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it + specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: + .nf + .sp +- ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd ++ ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd + .sp + .fi + .PP +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 1996-03-19 09:22:25.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@ + * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + */ + ++#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H ++#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H ++ ++/* someone else may have defined this */ ++#undef __P ++ ++/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */ ++#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus) ++#define __P(args) args ++#else ++#define __P(args) () ++#endif ++ ++/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */ ++#include <netinet/in.h> ++#include <stdio.h> ++ ++__BEGIN_DECLS ++ + /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */ + + #define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */ +@@ -25,10 +44,10 @@ + char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */ + struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */ + struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */ +- void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ +- void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */ +- void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */ +- void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */ ++ void (*sink) __P((int)); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ ++ void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */ ++ void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */ ++ void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */ + struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */ + }; + +@@ -61,25 +80,30 @@ + /* Global functions. */ + + #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) +-extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */ ++extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); /* get/validate client host info */ + #else + #define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */ + #endif + +-extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */ +-extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */ +-extern char *percent_x(); /* do %<char> expansion */ +-extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ +-extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */ +-extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */ +-extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */ +-extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */ +-extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */ ++extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); /* execute shell command */ ++extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do %<char> expansion */ ++extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ ++extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ ++extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ ++extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); /* fgets() on steroids */ ++extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); /* strchr() and split */ ++extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */ + + /* Global variables. */ + ++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS ++extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ ++extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ ++#else + extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */ + extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */ ++#endif ++ + extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ + extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ + extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */ +@@ -92,9 +116,14 @@ + */ + + #ifdef __STDC__ ++extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request); ++extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr, ++ char *client_user); + extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); + extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); + #else ++extern int hosts_access(); ++extern int hosts_ctl(); + extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */ + extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */ + #endif +@@ -117,27 +146,31 @@ + * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. + */ + +-extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */ +-extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */ +-extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */ +-extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */ +-extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */ +-extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */ ++extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); /* client user */ ++extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable hostname */ ++extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable host address */ ++extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); /* host name or address */ ++extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ ++extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ + #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ + #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ + + /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */ + +-extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */ +-extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */ +-extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */ ++/* look up endpoint addresses */ ++extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *)); ++/* translate address to hostname */ ++extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); ++/* address to printable address */ ++extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); ++ + #define sock_methods(r) \ + { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } + + /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */ + + #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) +-extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ ++extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ + #endif + + /* +@@ -178,7 +211,7 @@ + * behavior. + */ + +-extern void process_options(); /* execute options */ ++extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */ + extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */ + + /* Bug workarounds. */ +@@ -217,3 +250,7 @@ + #define strtok my_strtok + extern char *my_strtok(); + #endif ++ ++__END_DECLS ++ ++#endif /* tcpd.h */ +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 1997-02-11 19:13:25.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ + { + if (pat[0] == '@') { + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { ++ tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat); + } else if (pat[0] == '.') { + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); + } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { +@@ -382,6 +384,8 @@ + { + if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { ++ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat); + } else if (pat[0] == '.') { + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); + } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { +@@ -402,8 +406,13 @@ + static int check_host(pat) + char *pat; + { ++ char buf[BUFSIZ]; + char *mask; + int addr_count = 1; ++ FILE *fp; ++ struct tcpd_context saved_context; ++ char *cp; ++ char *wsp = " \t\r\n"; + + if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ + #ifdef NO_NETGRENT +@@ -422,6 +431,21 @@ + tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); + #endif + #endif ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */ ++ if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) { ++ saved_context = tcpd_context; ++ tcpd_context.file = pat; ++ tcpd_context.line = 0; ++ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { ++ tcpd_context.line++; ++ for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp)) ++ check_host(cp); ++ } ++ tcpd_context = saved_context; ++ fclose(fp); ++ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { ++ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat); ++ } + } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ + if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE + || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" ++.SH NAME ++try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper ++.SH SYNOPSIS ++.B try-from ++.SH DESCRIPTION ++The ++.B try-from ++command can be called via a remote shell command to find out ++if the hostname and address are properly recognized ++by the ++.B tcp_wrapper ++library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI ++on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through ++.BR syslog (3) ++and redirected to stderr. ++ ++Example: ++ ++rsh host /some/where/try-from ++ ++.SH SEE ALSO ++.BR hosts_access (5), ++.BR hosts_options (5), ++.BR tcpd (8) ++.SH AUTHOR ++Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. ++ +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++ /* ++ * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50 ++ * ++ * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org> ++ */ ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS ++#include <syslog.h> ++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; ++int allow_severity = SEVERITY; ++#endif +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c 1996-03-19 09:22:26.000000000 -0600 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 +@@ -163,7 +163,11 @@ + int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len) + int sock; + struct sockaddr *sa; ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) + int *len; ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ ++size_t *len; ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ + { + int ret; + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa; diff --git a/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c8f305 --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core-testing/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.SH NAME +try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B try-from +.SH DESCRIPTION +The +.B try-from +command can be called via a remote shell command to find out +if the hostname and address are properly recognized +by the +.B tcp_wrapper +library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI +on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through +.BR syslog (3) +and redirected to stderr. + +Example: + +rsh host /some/where/try-from + +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR hosts_access (5), +.BR hosts_options (5), +.BR tcpd (8) +.SH AUTHOR +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + |