From 8d2d9cec773a81a69f9a1eb77e79ec4bad6776d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Britney Fransen <brfransen@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2020 16:15:06 +0000
Subject: libcap: update to 2.43

---
 abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD                 |  59 +++---
 abs/core/libcap/libcap-2.23-header.patch | 350 -------------------------------
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 377 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 abs/core/libcap/libcap-2.23-header.patch

diff --git a/abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD b/abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD
index b6dbd5a..e9947da 100644
--- a/abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD
+++ b/abs/core/libcap/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,42 +1,47 @@
-#$Id: PKGBUILD 203064 2014-01-03 09:18:41Z allan $
-# Maintainer: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
+# Maintainer:  Bartłomiej Piotrowski <bpiotrowski@archlinux.org>
+# Contributor: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
 # Contributor: Hugo Doria <hugo@archlinux.org>
 
 pkgname=libcap
-pkgver=2.23
-pkgrel=2
-pkgdesc="POSIX 1003.1e capabilities"
-arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
-url="http://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/"
-license=('GPL2')
-depends=('glibc' 'attr')
-options=('!staticlibs')
-source=(https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/libcap2/libcap-2.23.tar.xz
-        libcap-2.23-header.patch)
+pkgver=2.43
+pkgrel=1
+pkgdesc='POSIX 1003.1e capabilities'
+arch=(x86_64)
+url='https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/'
+license=(GPL2)
+depends=(glibc attr)
+makedepends=(linux-api-headers)
+provides=(libcap.so)
+source=(https://kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/libcap2/libcap-$pkgver.tar.{xz,sign})
+validpgpkeys=(38A644698C69787344E954CE29EE848AE2CCF3F4) # Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
+sha512sums=('817add571fb2c54ad2a39974e6545b8fc8d855ecdcf2e00b2cc10e583802c49dfea2d8bca484c89ecd574fdacfc46565b51e3064a4407cf1985defb913240d45'
+            'SKIP')
 
 prepare() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-
-  # install into /usr/bin
+  cd $pkgname-$pkgver
   sed -i "/SBINDIR/s#sbin#bin#" Make.Rules
 
-  # fix header path issues
-  patch -p1 -i $srcdir/libcap-2.23-header.patch
-  # and fix the build with that patch
-  sed -i "s#uapi/##" libcap/Makefile
+  # use our buildflags
+  sed -i "s/CFLAGS :=/CFLAGS += \$(CPPFLAGS) /" Make.Rules
+  sed -i "s/LDFLAGS :=/LDFLAGS +=/" Make.Rules
 }
 
+_makeargs=(
+  KERNEL_HEADERS=/usr/include
+  RAISE_SETFCAP=no
+  SBINDIR=/usr/bin
+  lib=lib
+  prefix=/usr
+)
+
 build() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-  make
+  make -C $pkgname-$pkgver "${_makeargs[@]}"
 }
 
 package() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-  make prefix=/usr lib=/lib DESTDIR=${pkgdir} RAISE_SETFCAP=no install
-  
+  cd $pkgname-$pkgver
+  make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" "${_makeargs[@]}" install
+
   install -Dm644 pam_cap/capability.conf \
-    $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$pkgname/capability.conf.example
+    "$pkgdir"/usr/share/doc/$pkgname/capability.conf.example
 }
-md5sums=('09a185e4b0aa8a81a51c1e4d0eba7db0'
-         '945984c4bf5e601c24a7c80f001fb2c6')
diff --git a/abs/core/libcap/libcap-2.23-header.patch b/abs/core/libcap/libcap-2.23-header.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 74c45e0..0000000
--- a/abs/core/libcap/libcap-2.23-header.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,350 +0,0 @@
-From c3290668646b767058e55b29f7b8f4be4af2e660 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew G Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
-Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 01:56:31 +0000
-Subject: Fix up the uapi/linux include scheme.
-
-In adopting this uapi header file (without kernel internals), I previously
-messed up on the apparent location of the files. Thanks to Tom Gundersen for
-the clarification. Also, delete the non-uapi copies of things since they
-are no longer needed to build the library and tools.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew G Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
----
-diff --git a/Make.Rules b/Make.Rules
-index 9ca6c89..5b58c59 100644
---- a/Make.Rules
-+++ b/Make.Rules
-@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ MINOR=23
- 
- # Compilation specifics
- 
--KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include
--IPATH += -fPIC -I$(topdir)/libcap/include -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS)
-+KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include/uapi
-+IPATH += -fPIC -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) -I$(topdir)/libcap/include
- 
- CC := gcc
- CFLAGS := -O2 -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
-diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
-deleted file mode 100644
-index a6ee1f9..0000000
---- a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
--/*
-- * This is <linux/capability.h>
-- *
-- * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
-- * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
-- * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
-- *
-- * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
-- *
-- * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
-- */
--#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
--#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
--
--#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
--
--
--#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
--#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
--
--extern int file_caps_enabled;
--
--typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
--	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
--} kernel_cap_t;
--
--/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
--struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
--	__u32 magic_etc;
--	kernel_cap_t permitted;
--	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
--};
--
--#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
--#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
--
--
--struct file;
--struct inode;
--struct dentry;
--struct user_namespace;
--
--struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
--
--extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
--extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
--
--/*
-- * Internal kernel functions only
-- */
--
--#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
--	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
--
--/*
-- * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
-- *
-- * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
-- * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
-- *
-- * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
-- *
-- * We could also define fsmask as follows:
-- *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
-- *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
-- */
--
--# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
--			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
--			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
--			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
--			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
--			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
--
--# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
--
--#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
--# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
--#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
--
--# define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
--# define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
--# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
--				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
--				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
--# define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
--				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
--				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
--
--#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
--
--# define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
--
--#define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
--#define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
--#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
--
--#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP)                                    \
--do {                                                                \
--	unsigned __capi;                                            \
--	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
--		c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi];     \
--	}                                                           \
--} while (0)
--
--#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP)                                       \
--do {                                                                \
--	unsigned __capi;                                            \
--	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
--		c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi];                   \
--	}                                                           \
--} while (0)
--
--static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
--				       const kernel_cap_t b)
--{
--	kernel_cap_t dest;
--	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
--	return dest;
--}
--
--static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
--					 const kernel_cap_t b)
--{
--	kernel_cap_t dest;
--	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
--	return dest;
--}
--
--static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
--				    const kernel_cap_t drop)
--{
--	kernel_cap_t dest;
--	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
--	return dest;
--}
--
--static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
--{
--	kernel_cap_t dest;
--	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
--	return dest;
--}
--
--static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
--{
--	unsigned __capi;
--	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
--		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
--			return 0;
--	}
--	return 1;
--}
--
--/*
-- * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
-- * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
-- *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
-- * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
-- *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
-- */
--static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
--{
--	kernel_cap_t dest;
--	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
--	return cap_isclear(dest);
--}
--
--/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
--
--static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
--{
--	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
--	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
--}
--
--static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
--{
--	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
--	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
--}
--
--static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
--					    const kernel_cap_t permitted)
--{
--	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
--	return cap_combine(a,
--			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
--}
--
--static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
--{
--	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
--	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
--}
--
--static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
--					      const kernel_cap_t permitted)
--{
--	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
--	return cap_combine(a,
--			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
--}
--
--extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
--extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
--			      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
--extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
--extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
--				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
--extern bool capable(int cap);
--extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
--extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
--extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
--
--/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
--extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
--
--#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
-diff --git a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
-index 56fc7fd..64ac50e 100644
---- a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
-+++ b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
-@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ extern "C" {
- #ifndef __user
- #define __user
- #endif
--#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
-+#include <linux/capability.h>
- #include <linux/xattr.h>
- 
- /*
-diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
-index a3baeb2..289760f 100644
---- a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h
-+++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
-@@ -102,4 +102,51 @@
- 
- #define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34
- 
-+/*
-+ * Tune up process memory map specifics.
-+ */
-+#define PR_SET_MM		35
-+# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE		1
-+# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE		2
-+# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA		3
-+# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA		4
-+# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK		5
-+# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK		6
-+# define PR_SET_MM_BRK			7
-+# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START		8
-+# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END		9
-+# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START		10
-+# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END		11
-+# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV			12
-+# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE		13
-+
-+/*
-+ * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task.
-+ * A value of 0 mean "no process".
-+ */
-+#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
-+# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1)
-+
-+#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER	36
-+#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER	37
-+
-+/*
-+ * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e.
-+ * execve) will either fail or not grant them.  This affects suid/sgid,
-+ * file capabilities, and LSMs.
-+ *
-+ * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid,
-+ * capset, etc.) will still work.  Drop those privileges if you want them gone.
-+ *
-+ * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege.  So, for example,
-+ * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
-+ * in execve returning -EPERM.
-+ *
-+ * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
-+ */
-+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	38
-+#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	39
-+
-+#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS	40
-+
- #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
-diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
-index 3340617..985aac9 100644
---- a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h
-+++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
-@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
--#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
--#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
-+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
-+#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
- 
- /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
-    whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
-    setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
-    changed from user-level. */
- #define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X))
--#ifdef __KERNEL__
--#define issecure(X)		(issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
--#endif
- 
- #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
- 
-@@ -51,4 +48,4 @@
- 				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
- #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
- 
--#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
-+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
---
-cgit v0.9.2
-- 
cgit v0.12

