From 0b9399abdb44bb7fc85da014c69b1cc540830c8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Britney Fransen Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:53:07 +0000 Subject: pam: update to 1.2.1 --- abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD | 37 ++++++++++++-------- abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch create mode 100644 abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch diff --git a/abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD b/abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD index 965f215..9290c1e 100644 --- a/abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD +++ b/abs/core/pam/PKGBUILD @@ -1,31 +1,40 @@ -# $Id: PKGBUILD 197836 2013-10-30 11:06:23Z allan $ +# $Id$ # Maintainer: Tobias Powalowski # Contributor: judd pkgname=pam -pkgver=1.1.8 -pkgrel=2 +pkgver=1.2.1 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) library" arch=('i686' 'x86_64') license=('GPL2') -url="http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/" -depends=('glibc' 'db' 'cracklib' 'libtirpc' 'pambase') +url="http://linux-pam.org" +depends=('glibc' 'cracklib' 'libtirpc' 'pambase') makedepends=('flex' 'w3m' 'docbook-xml>=4.4' 'docbook-xsl') backup=(etc/security/{access.conf,group.conf,limits.conf,namespace.conf,namespace.init,pam_env.conf,time.conf} etc/default/passwd etc/environment) -source=(https://fedorahosted.org/releases/l/i/linux-pam/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.bz2 - #http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/library/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.bz2 - ftp://ftp.archlinux.org/other/pam_unix2/pam_unix2-2.9.1.tar.bz2 +source=(http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.bz2 + https://sources.archlinux.org/other/pam_unix2/pam_unix2-2.9.1.tar.bz2 pam_unix2-glibc216.patch) +md5sums=('9dc53067556d2dd567808fd509519dd6' + 'da6a46e5f8cd3eaa7cbc4fc3a7e2b555' + 'dac109f68e04a4df37575fda6001ea17') + options=('!emptydirs') +prepare () { + cd $srcdir/Linux-PAM-$pkgver + + # fix pam_unix2 building + cd $srcdir/pam_unix2-2.9.1 + patch -Np1 -i "${srcdir}/pam_unix2-glibc216.patch" +} + build() { cd $srcdir/Linux-PAM-$pkgver - ./configure --libdir=/usr/lib --sbindir=/usr/bin + ./configure --libdir=/usr/lib --sbindir=/usr/bin --disable-db make cd $srcdir/pam_unix2-2.9.1 - patch -Np1 -i ../pam_unix2-glibc216.patch - # modify flags to build against the pam compiled here, not a system lib. ./configure \ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -I$srcdir/Linux-PAM-$pkgver/libpam/include/" \ @@ -63,7 +72,7 @@ _EOT # set unix_chkpwd uid chmod +s $pkgdir/usr/bin/unix_chkpwd + # remove doc which is not used anymore + # FS #40749 + rm $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/Linux-PAM/sag-pam_userdb.html } -md5sums=('35b6091af95981b1b2cd60d813b5e4ee' - 'da6a46e5f8cd3eaa7cbc4fc3a7e2b555' - 'dac109f68e04a4df37575fda6001ea17') diff --git a/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch b/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96fa916 --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 57a1e2b274d0a6376d92ada9926e5c5741e7da20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" +Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 22:18:32 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_userdb: fix password hash comparison + +Starting with commit Linux-PAM-0-77-28-g0b3e583 that introduced hashed +passwords support in pam_userdb, hashes are compared case-insensitively. +This bug leads to accepting hashes for completely different passwords in +addition to those that should be accepted. + +Additionally, commit Linux-PAM-1_1_6-13-ge2a8187 that added support for +modern password hashes with different lengths and settings, did not +update the hash comparison accordingly, which leads to accepting +computed hashes longer than stored hashes when the latter is a prefix +of the former. + +* modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c (user_lookup): Reject the computed +hash whose length differs from the stored hash length. +Compare computed and stored hashes case-sensitively. +Fixes CVE-2013-7041. + +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/731368 +--- + modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c | 9 ++++++--- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c +index de8b5b1..ff040e6 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c ++++ b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c +@@ -222,12 +222,15 @@ user_lookup (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *database, const char *cryptmode, + } else { + cryptpw = crypt (pass, data.dptr); + +- if (cryptpw) { +- compare = strncasecmp (data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize); ++ if (cryptpw && strlen(cryptpw) == (size_t)data.dsize) { ++ compare = memcmp(data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize); + } else { + compare = -2; + if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) { +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL"); ++ if (cryptpw) ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "lengths of computed and stored hashes differ"); ++ else ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL"); + } + }; + +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch b/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2aa2de --- /dev/null +++ b/abs/core/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" +Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:17:23 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_timestamp: fix potential directory traversal issue + (ticket #27) + +pam_timestamp uses values of PAM_RUSER and PAM_TTY as components of +the timestamp pathname it creates, so extra care should be taken to +avoid potential directory traversal issues. + +* modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c (check_tty): Treat +"." and ".." tty values as invalid. +(get_ruser): Treat "." and ".." ruser values, as well as any ruser +value containing '/', as invalid. + +Fixes CVE-2014-2583. + +Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer +--- + modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c | 13 ++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c +index 5193733..b3f08b1 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c ++++ b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c +@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ check_tty(const char *tty) + tty = strrchr(tty, '/') + 1; + } + /* Make sure the tty wasn't actually a directory (no basename). */ +- if (strlen(tty) == 0) { ++ if (!strlen(tty) || !strcmp(tty, ".") || !strcmp(tty, "..")) { + return NULL; + } + return tty; +@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *ruserbuf, size_t ruserbuflen) + if (pwd != NULL) { + ruser = pwd->pw_name; + } ++ } else { ++ /* ++ * This ruser is used by format_timestamp_name as a component ++ * of constructed timestamp pathname, so ".", "..", and '/' ++ * are disallowed to avoid potential path traversal issues. ++ */ ++ if (!strcmp(ruser, ".") || ++ !strcmp(ruser, "..") || ++ strchr(ruser, '/')) { ++ ruser = NULL; ++ } + } + if (ruser == NULL || strlen(ruser) >= ruserbuflen) { + *ruserbuf = '\0'; +-- +1.8.3.1 + -- cgit v0.12