From dd0640965bc6bc0fd1ade2c7ef21e0475392bbf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Meyer Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2012 14:00:36 -0500 Subject: tcp_wrappers: removed, no longer supported --- abs/core/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD | 35 - abs/core/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch | 11 - abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow | 5 - abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny | 7 - abs/core/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 | 34 - abs/core/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch | 1025 -------------------- abs/core/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 | 28 - 7 files changed, 1145 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 abs/core/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD delete mode 100644 abs/core/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch delete mode 100644 abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow delete mode 100644 abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny delete mode 100644 abs/core/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 delete mode 100644 abs/core/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch delete mode 100644 abs/core/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 diff --git a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD b/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD deleted file mode 100644 index 5612e23..0000000 --- a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/PKGBUILD +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -# $Id: PKGBUILD 356 2008-04-18 22:56:27Z aaron $ -# Maintainer: judd -pkgname=tcp_wrappers -pkgver=7.6 -pkgrel=17 -pkgdesc="Monitors and Controls incoming TCP connections" -arch=(i686 x86_64) -url="ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html" -license=('custom') -groups=('base') -backup=(etc/hosts.allow etc/hosts.deny) -depends=('bash' 'glibc') -source=(ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/${pkgname}_$pkgver.tar.gz \ - hosts.allow hosts.deny try-from.8 safe_finger.8 gcc340.patch \ - shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch) -md5sums=('e6fa25f71226d090f34de3f6b122fb5a' '32cfeeed797161034f62bb45f3167baa'\ - 'a0ee30f6aeaca241c4d44f7c177eca6b' '4a8f40f9a69f0848df92b232072e8561'\ - '1a6d7b11abb1fd69ace775d02a1c72cf' '19c3badd4fbee547eb9de61ed93691af'\ - 'e39dc7e099b741b6d2b1799a56ab77af') - -build() { - cd $startdir/src/${pkgname}_$pkgver - patch -Np1 -i ../gcc340.patch || return 1 - patch -Np1 -i ../shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch || return 1 - make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin STYLE=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED linux || return 1 - # dumb makefile - mkdir -p $startdir/pkg/usr/{include,lib,sbin} - mkdir -p $startdir/pkg/usr/share/man/man{3,5,8} - make DESTDIR=$startdir/pkg install - install -D -m644 ../hosts.allow $startdir/pkg/etc/hosts.allow - install -D -m644 ../hosts.deny $startdir/pkg/etc/hosts.deny - # install license - mkdir -p $startdir/pkg/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname - install -m644 DISCLAIMER $startdir/pkg/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/license.txt -} diff --git a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch b/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d0a2750..0000000 --- a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/gcc340.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6-orig/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6-orig/scaffold.c 1997-03-21 10:27:24.000000000 -0800 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 2004-05-07 19:44:50.000000000 -0700 -@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ - #define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ - #endif - --extern char *malloc(); - - /* Application-specific. */ - diff --git a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow b/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow deleted file mode 100644 index e5c035d..0000000 --- a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.allow +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -# -# /etc/hosts.allow -# - -# End of file diff --git a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny b/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny deleted file mode 100644 index efcce18..0000000 --- a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/hosts.deny +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ -# -# /etc/hosts.deny -# - -ALL: ALL: DENY - -# End of file diff --git a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 b/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 deleted file mode 100644 index 875616b..0000000 --- a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.8 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" -.SH NAME -safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff -from finger servers -.SH SYNOPSIS -.B safe_finger [finger_options] -.SH DESCRIPTION -The -.B safe_finger -command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this -program for automatic reverse finger probes from the -.B tcp_wrapper -.B (tcpd) -, not the raw finger command. The -.B safe_finger -command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root -privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH -environment. -.B safe_finger -will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some -finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in -the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere -on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps -sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines. -The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged. -.B safe_finger -takes care of all this badness. -.SH SEE ALSO -.BR hosts_access (5), -.BR hosts_options (5), -.BR tcpd (8) -.SH AUTHOR -Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - diff --git a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch b/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 89b0b0c..0000000 --- a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1025 +0,0 @@ -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile 1997-03-21 12:27:21.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile 2002-07-15 16:07:21.000000000 -0500 -@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -+GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h) -+ - # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20 - -+# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable -+HOSTNAME = -+ - what: - @echo - @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:" -@@ -19,7 +24,7 @@ - @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)" - @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543" - @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix" -- @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" -+ @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" - @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4" - @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" - @echo " uts215 uxp" -@@ -43,8 +48,8 @@ - # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx - #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc - # --# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX --#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin -+# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux -+REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin - # - # BSD 4.4 - #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec -@@ -141,10 +146,21 @@ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ - EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all - -+ifneq ($(GLIBC),0) -+MYLIB=-lnsl -+endif -+ - linux: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ -- LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ -- NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all -+ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ -+ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ -+ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" -+ -+gnu: -+ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ -+ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ -+ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ -+ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" - - # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. - hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: -@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ - # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module - # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv(). - --AUX_OBJ= setenv.o -+#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o - #AUX_OBJ= environ.o - #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o - -@@ -454,7 +470,8 @@ - # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work - # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions. - --BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK -+BUGS = -+#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK - #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG - #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG - -@@ -464,7 +481,7 @@ - # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following - # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control. - # --#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP -+NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP - - ############################################################### - # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog() -@@ -491,7 +508,7 @@ - # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions - # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn). - # --#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. -+STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. - - ################################################################ - # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records -@@ -514,7 +531,7 @@ - # - # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file. - --FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use -+FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use - - # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged. - -@@ -610,7 +627,7 @@ - # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname - # lookups altogether, see the next section. - --PARANOID= -DPARANOID -+#PARANOID= -DPARANOID - - ######################################## - # Optional: turning off hostname lookups -@@ -623,7 +640,7 @@ - # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid - # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition. - --HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME -+#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME - - ############################################# - # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking -@@ -649,28 +666,46 @@ - # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives, - # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details. - # --# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS -+KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS - - ## End configuration options - ############################ - - # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs. - -+CC = gcc - SHELL = /bin/sh --.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c -+.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c -+ -+SOMAJOR = 0 -+SOMINOR = 7.6 -+ -+LIB = libwrap.a -+SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR) -+SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -+SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so -+SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap - --CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ -+shared/%.o: %.c -+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ -+ -+CFLAGS = -O2 -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ - $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \ - -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \ - -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \ - $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \ - $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME) - -+SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS) -+SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT -+ - LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \ - hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \ - $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \ - update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o - -+SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ)); -+ - FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o - - KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \ -@@ -684,46 +719,80 @@ - refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \ - scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS - --LIB = libwrap.a -- --all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk -+all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB) - - # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed. - - config-check: - @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; } -- @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ -- if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ -- then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ -- else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \ -+ @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \ -+ if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \ -+ then rm cflags.new ; \ -+ else mv cflags.new cflags ; \ - fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null -+ @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi - - $(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ) - rm -f $(LIB) - $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ) - -$(RANLIB) $(LIB) - --tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB) -- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) -+$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ) -+ rm -f $(SHLIB) -+ $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ) -+ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ) -+ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO) -+ -+tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB) -+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) - --miscd: miscd.o $(LIB) -- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) -+miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB) -+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) - --safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB) -- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) -+safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB) -+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) - - TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o - --tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) -- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) -+tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB) -+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) - --try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) -- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) -+try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB) -+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) - - TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o - --tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) -- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) -+tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB) -+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) -+ -+install: install-lib install-bin install-dev -+ -+install-lib: -+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ -+ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) -+ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO)) -+ -+install-bin: -+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 try-from.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 safe_finger.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ -+ -+install-dev: -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/ -+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ -+ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3 -+ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3 -+ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3 - - shar: $(KIT) - @shar $(KIT) -@@ -739,7 +808,8 @@ - - clean: - rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \ -- cflags -+ cflags libwrap*.so* -+ rm -rf shared - - tidy: clean - chmod -R a+r . -@@ -885,5 +955,6 @@ - update.o: mystdarg.h - update.o: tcpd.h - vfprintf.o: cflags -+weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h - workarounds.o: cflags - workarounds.o: tcpd.h -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c 1997-04-07 19:29:19.000000000 -0500 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -35,7 +35,12 @@ - #ifdef IP_OPTIONS - unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp; - char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; -+#if !defined(__GLIBC__) - int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; -+#else /* __GLIBC__ */ -+ size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf); -+ int ipproto; -+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ - struct protoent *ip; - int fd = request->fd; - unsigned int opt; -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 1996-02-11 10:01:27.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ - hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library - .SH SYNOPSIS - .nf --#include "tcpd.h" -+#include - - extern int allow_severity; - extern int deny_severity; -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 1995-01-30 12:51:47.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ - impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a - quick introduction. - .PP --An extended version of the access control language is described in the --\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at --program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. -+The extended version of the access control language is described in the -+\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes -+the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR - .PP - In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a - network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of -@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ - character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are - easier to edit. - .IP \(bu --Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored. -+Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored. - This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables - are easier to read. - .IP \(bu -@@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ - .SH PATTERNS - The access control language implements the following patterns: - .IP \(bu --A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if -+A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if - the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For --example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name --`wzv.win.tue.nl\'. -+example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name -+`wzv.win.tue.nl'. - .IP \(bu --A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if -+A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if - its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the --pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the -+pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the - Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x). - .IP \(bu --A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS -+A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS - (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host - member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported - for daemon process names or for client user names. - .IP \(bu --An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a --`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the --bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask --pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the --range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. -+An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a -+`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the -+bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask -+pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the -+range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'. -+.IP \(bu -+A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file -+name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name -+or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is -+zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns -+separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere -+a host name or address pattern can be used. - .SH WILDCARDS - The access control language supports explicit wildcards: - .IP ALL -@@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ - .ne 6 - .SH OPERATORS - .IP EXCEPT --Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct -+Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct - matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches - \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in - client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control --language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\' --would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'. -+language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c' -+would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'. - .br - .ne 6 - .SH SHELL COMMANDS - If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that - command is subjected to % substitutions (see next section). - The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard --input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\' -+input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&' - at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has - completed. - .PP -@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ - .IP %u - The client user name (or "unknown"). - .IP %% --Expands to a single `%\' character. -+Expands to a single `%' character. - .PP - Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by - underscores. -@@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ - less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the - client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much - harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that --the client\'s IDENT server is lying. -+the client's IDENT server is lying. - .PP --Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. -+Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services. - .SH EXAMPLES - The language is flexible enough that different types of access control - policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language -@@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ - .br - ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu - .PP --The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\' -+The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.' - in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP - netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the - \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of -@@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ - /etc/hosts.deny: - .in +3 - .nf --in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ -- /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) & -+in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ -+ /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) & - .fi - .PP - The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be -@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ - capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not - terminated by a newline character; when the result of % - expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails --that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. -+that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. - .SH FILES - .na - .nf -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 1997-02-11 19:13:23.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -240,6 +240,26 @@ - } - } - -+/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */ -+ -+static int hostfile_match(path, host) -+char *path; -+struct hosts_info *host; -+{ -+ char tok[BUFSIZ]; -+ int match = NO; -+ FILE *fp; -+ -+ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { -+ while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host))) -+ /* void */ ; -+ fclose(fp); -+ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { -+ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path); -+ } -+ return (match); -+} -+ - /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */ - - static int host_match(tok, host) -@@ -267,6 +287,8 @@ - tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */ - return (NO); - #endif -+ } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */ -+ return (hostfile_match(tok, host)); - } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */ - char *name = eval_hostname(host); - return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 1994-12-28 10:42:29.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ - Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after - performing the % expansions described in the hosts_access(5) - manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr --connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the -+connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the - conversation with the client host. Example: - .sp - .nf - .ti +3 --spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) & -+spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) & - .fi - .sp - executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c 1996-02-11 10:01:32.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ - #ifdef LOG_CRON - "cron", LOG_CRON, - #endif -+#ifdef LOG_FTP -+ "ftp", LOG_FTP, -+#endif - #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0 - "local0", LOG_LOCAL0, - #endif -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c 1994-12-28 10:42:37.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ - #include - - extern int errno; --#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -+#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) - extern char *sys_errlist[]; - extern int sys_nerr; - #endif -@@ -29,11 +29,15 @@ - - while (*bp = *cp) - if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') { -+#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR -+ strcpy(bp, strerror(errno)); -+#else - if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) { - strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]); - } else { - sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno); - } -+#endif - bp += strlen(bp); - cp += 2; - } else { -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c 1995-01-02 09:11:34.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ - - int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */ - --static jmp_buf timebuf; -+static sigjmp_buf timebuf; - - /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */ - -@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ - static void timeout(sig) - int sig; - { -- longjmp(timebuf, sig); -+ siglongjmp(timebuf, sig); - } - - /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ -@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ - * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. - */ - -- if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { -+ if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) { - signal(SIGALRM, timeout); - alarm(rfc931_timeout); - -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ -+.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" -+.SH NAME -+safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff -+from finger servers -+.SH SYNOPSIS -+.B safe_finger [finger_options] -+.SH DESCRIPTION -+The -+.B safe_finger -+command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this -+program for automatic reverse finger probes from the -+.B tcp_wrapper -+.B (tcpd) -+, not the raw finger command. The -+.B safe_finger -+command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root -+privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH -+environment. -+.B safe_finger -+will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some -+finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in -+the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere -+on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps -+sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines. -+The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged. -+.B safe_finger -+takes care of all this badness. -+.SH SEE ALSO -+.BR hosts_access (5), -+.BR hosts_options (5), -+.BR tcpd (8) -+.SH AUTHOR -+Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. -+ -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c 1994-12-28 10:42:42.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -26,21 +26,24 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - extern void exit(); - - /* Local stuff */ - --char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin"; -+char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin"; - - #define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ - #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ - #define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */ - #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */ - #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */ --#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */ -+#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */ - - int finger_pid; -+int allow_severity = SEVERITY; -+int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; - - void cleanup(sig) - int sig; -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 1997-03-21 12:27:24.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -180,10 +180,12 @@ - - /* ARGSUSED */ - --void rfc931(request) --struct request_info *request; -+void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) -+struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; -+struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; -+char *dest; - { -- strcpy(request->user, unknown); -+ strcpy(dest, unknown); - } - - /* check_path - examine accessibility */ -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c 1997-03-21 12:27:25.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ - { - static struct sockaddr_in client; - static struct sockaddr_in server; -+#if !defined (__GLIBC__) - int len; -+#else /* __GLIBC__ */ -+ size_t len; -+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - int fd = request->fd; - -@@ -224,7 +228,11 @@ - { - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - struct sockaddr_in sin; -+#if !defined(__GLIBC__) - int size = sizeof(sin); -+#else /* __GLIBC__ */ -+ size_t size = sizeof(sin); -+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ - - /* - * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 1996-02-21 09:39:16.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ - .PP - The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some - systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have --no `in.\' prefix to their name. -+no `in.' prefix to their name. - .SH EXAMPLE 2 - This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons - are left in their original place. -@@ -110,26 +110,26 @@ - becomes: - .sp - .ti +5 --finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd -+finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd - .sp - .fi - .PP - The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some - systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the --daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid -+daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid - field in the inetd configuration file. - .PP - Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be --covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) -+covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) - process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to --execute the `inetimp\' command. -+execute the `inetimp' command. - .SH EXAMPLE 3 - In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" - or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it - specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: - .nf - .sp -- ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd -+ ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd - .sp - .fi - .PP -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 1996-03-19 09:22:25.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@ - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -+#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H -+#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H -+ -+/* someone else may have defined this */ -+#undef __P -+ -+/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */ -+#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus) -+#define __P(args) args -+#else -+#define __P(args) () -+#endif -+ -+/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */ -+#include -+#include -+ -+__BEGIN_DECLS -+ - /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */ - - #define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */ -@@ -25,10 +44,10 @@ - char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */ - struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */ - struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */ -- void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ -- void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */ -- void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */ -- void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */ -+ void (*sink) __P((int)); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ -+ void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */ -+ void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */ -+ void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */ - struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */ - }; - -@@ -61,25 +80,30 @@ - /* Global functions. */ - - #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) --extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */ -+extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); /* get/validate client host info */ - #else - #define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */ - #endif - --extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */ --extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */ --extern char *percent_x(); /* do % expansion */ --extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ --extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */ --extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */ --extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */ --extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */ --extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */ -+extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); /* execute shell command */ -+extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do % expansion */ -+extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ -+extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ -+extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ -+extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); /* fgets() on steroids */ -+extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); /* strchr() and split */ -+extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */ - - /* Global variables. */ - -+#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS -+extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ -+extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ -+#else - extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */ - extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */ -+#endif -+ - extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ - extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ - extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */ -@@ -92,9 +116,14 @@ - */ - - #ifdef __STDC__ -+extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request); -+extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr, -+ char *client_user); - extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); - extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); - #else -+extern int hosts_access(); -+extern int hosts_ctl(); - extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */ - extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */ - #endif -@@ -117,27 +146,31 @@ - * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. - */ - --extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */ --extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */ --extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */ --extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */ --extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */ --extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */ -+extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); /* client user */ -+extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable hostname */ -+extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable host address */ -+extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); /* host name or address */ -+extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ -+extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ - #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ - #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ - - /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */ - --extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */ --extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */ --extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */ -+/* look up endpoint addresses */ -+extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *)); -+/* translate address to hostname */ -+extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); -+/* address to printable address */ -+extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); -+ - #define sock_methods(r) \ - { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } - - /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */ - - #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) --extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ -+extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ - #endif - - /* -@@ -178,7 +211,7 @@ - * behavior. - */ - --extern void process_options(); /* execute options */ -+extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */ - extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */ - - /* Bug workarounds. */ -@@ -217,3 +250,7 @@ - #define strtok my_strtok - extern char *my_strtok(); - #endif -+ -+__END_DECLS -+ -+#endif /* tcpd.h */ -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 1997-02-11 19:13:25.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ - { - if (pat[0] == '@') { - tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); -+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { -+ tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat); - } else if (pat[0] == '.') { - tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); - } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { -@@ -382,6 +384,8 @@ - { - if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ - tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); -+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { -+ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat); - } else if (pat[0] == '.') { - tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); - } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { -@@ -402,8 +406,13 @@ - static int check_host(pat) - char *pat; - { -+ char buf[BUFSIZ]; - char *mask; - int addr_count = 1; -+ FILE *fp; -+ struct tcpd_context saved_context; -+ char *cp; -+ char *wsp = " \t\r\n"; - - if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ - #ifdef NO_NETGRENT -@@ -422,6 +431,21 @@ - tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); - #endif - #endif -+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */ -+ if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) { -+ saved_context = tcpd_context; -+ tcpd_context.file = pat; -+ tcpd_context.line = 0; -+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { -+ tcpd_context.line++; -+ for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp)) -+ check_host(cp); -+ } -+ tcpd_context = saved_context; -+ fclose(fp); -+ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { -+ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat); -+ } - } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ - if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE - || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ -+.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" -+.SH NAME -+try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper -+.SH SYNOPSIS -+.B try-from -+.SH DESCRIPTION -+The -+.B try-from -+command can be called via a remote shell command to find out -+if the hostname and address are properly recognized -+by the -+.B tcp_wrapper -+library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI -+on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through -+.BR syslog (3) -+and redirected to stderr. -+ -+Example: -+ -+rsh host /some/where/try-from -+ -+.SH SEE ALSO -+.BR hosts_access (5), -+.BR hosts_options (5), -+.BR tcpd (8) -+.SH AUTHOR -+Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. -+ -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ -+ /* -+ * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50 -+ * -+ * Author: Anthony Towns -+ */ -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS -+#include -+int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; -+int allow_severity = SEVERITY; -+#endif -diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c ---- tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c 1996-03-19 09:22:26.000000000 -0600 -+++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 -@@ -163,7 +163,11 @@ - int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len) - int sock; - struct sockaddr *sa; -+#if !defined(__GLIBC__) - int *len; -+#else /* __GLIBC__ */ -+size_t *len; -+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ - { - int ret; - struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa; diff --git a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 b/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 deleted file mode 100644 index 9c8f305..0000000 --- a/abs/core/tcp_wrappers/try-from.8 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" -.SH NAME -try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper -.SH SYNOPSIS -.B try-from -.SH DESCRIPTION -The -.B try-from -command can be called via a remote shell command to find out -if the hostname and address are properly recognized -by the -.B tcp_wrapper -library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI -on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through -.BR syslog (3) -and redirected to stderr. - -Example: - -rsh host /some/where/try-from - -.SH SEE ALSO -.BR hosts_access (5), -.BR hosts_options (5), -.BR tcpd (8) -.SH AUTHOR -Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - -- cgit v0.12