From c3290668646b767058e55b29f7b8f4be4af2e660 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew G Morgan Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 01:56:31 +0000 Subject: Fix up the uapi/linux include scheme. In adopting this uapi header file (without kernel internals), I previously messed up on the apparent location of the files. Thanks to Tom Gundersen for the clarification. Also, delete the non-uapi copies of things since they are no longer needed to build the library and tools. Signed-off-by: Andrew G Morgan --- diff --git a/Make.Rules b/Make.Rules index 9ca6c89..5b58c59 100644 --- a/Make.Rules +++ b/Make.Rules @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ MINOR=23 # Compilation specifics -KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include -IPATH += -fPIC -I$(topdir)/libcap/include -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) +KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include/uapi +IPATH += -fPIC -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) -I$(topdir)/libcap/include CC := gcc CFLAGS := -O2 -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/linux/capability.h deleted file mode 100644 index a6ee1f9..0000000 --- a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,219 +0,0 @@ -/* - * This is - * - * Andrew G. Morgan - * Alexander Kjeldaas - * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main. - * - * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance): - * - * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/ - */ -#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H - -#include - - -#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 -#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 - -extern int file_caps_enabled; - -typedef struct kernel_cap_struct { - __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; -} kernel_cap_t; - -/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */ -struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { - __u32 magic_etc; - kernel_cap_t permitted; - kernel_cap_t inheritable; -}; - -#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct)) -#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t)) - - -struct file; -struct inode; -struct dentry; -struct user_namespace; - -struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void); - -extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set; -extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; - -/* - * Internal kernel functions only - */ - -#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \ - for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) - -/* - * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS: - * - * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant. - * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. - * - * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs. - * - * We could also define fsmask as follows: - * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions - * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions - */ - -# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID)) - -# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - -#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 -# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers -#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ - -# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) -# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ - CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) -# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \ - CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) - -#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ - -# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0) - -#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) -#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) -#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) - -#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \ -do { \ - unsigned __capi; \ - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \ - c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \ - } \ -} while (0) - -#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \ -do { \ - unsigned __capi; \ - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \ - c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \ - } \ -} while (0) - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t b) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t b) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t drop) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~); - return dest; -} - -static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - unsigned __capi; - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { - if (a.cap[__capi] != 0) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/* - * Check if "a" is a subset of "set". - * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set" - * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1 - * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set" - * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0 - */ -static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - dest = cap_drop(a, set); - return cap_isclear(dest); -} - -/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */ - -static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t permitted) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return cap_combine(a, - cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set)); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET; - return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t permitted) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET; - return cap_combine(a, - cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set)); -} - -extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap); -extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap); -extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool capable(int cap); -extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap); -extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - -/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ -extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); - -#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */ diff --git a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h index 56fc7fd..64ac50e 100644 --- a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h +++ b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ extern "C" { #ifndef __user #define __user #endif -#include +#include #include /* diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index a3baeb2..289760f 100644 --- a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h +++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -102,4 +102,51 @@ #define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34 +/* + * Tune up process memory map specifics. + */ +#define PR_SET_MM 35 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE 1 +# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE 2 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA 3 +# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA 4 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK 5 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK 6 +# define PR_SET_MM_BRK 7 +# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8 +# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9 +# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10 +# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11 +# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV 12 +# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE 13 + +/* + * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task. + * A value of 0 mean "no process". + */ +#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61 +# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1) + +#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 36 +#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 37 + +/* + * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e. + * execve) will either fail or not grant them. This affects suid/sgid, + * file capabilities, and LSMs. + * + * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid, + * capset, etc.) will still work. Drop those privileges if you want them gone. + * + * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example, + * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result + * in execve returning -EPERM. + * + * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details. + */ +#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38 +#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39 + +#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS 40 + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h index 3340617..985aac9 100644 --- a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h +++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h @@ -1,14 +1,11 @@ -#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H -#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1 +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be changed from user-level. */ #define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) -#ifdef __KERNEL__ -#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) -#endif #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 @@ -51,4 +48,4 @@ issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1) -#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */ +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */ -- cgit v0.9.2