Mass move of uncompiled packages to abs_not_built.

The will sit here for a bit, and then will be removed completely if no one claims them.

5 files changed, 0 insertions, 659 deletions

diff --git a/abs/core/coreutils/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch b/abs/core/coreutils/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 087b87c..0000000
--- a/abs/core/coreutils/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From 6124a3842dfa8484b52e067a8ab8105c3875a4f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jim Meyering <meyering@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 19:43:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ls: color each symlink-to-relative-name in / properly
-
-In order for ls --color to color each symlink, it must form the name
-of each referent and then stat it to see if the link is dangling, to
-a directory, to a file, etc.  When the symlink is to a relative name,
-ls must concatenate the starting directory name and that relative name.
-When, in addition, the starting directory was "/" or "/some-name",
-the result was ill-formed, and the subsequent stat would usually fail,
-making the caller color it as a dangling symlink.
-* src/ls.c (make_link_name): Don't botch the case in which
-dir_name(NAME) == "/" and LINKNAME is relative.
-* tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color: New file.  Test for the above.
-* tests/Makefile.am (TESTS): Add it.
-* NEWS (Bug fixes): Mention it.
-Reported by Mike Frysinger in http://bugs.gnu.org/11453
-Bug introduced by commit v8.16-23-gbcb9078.
----
- NEWS                            |  5 ++++
- src/ls.c                        |  9 +++++++-
- tests/Makefile.am               |  1 +
- tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100755 tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color
-
-diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
-index 6c620b3..f9e9c70 100644
---- a/NEWS
-+++ b/NEWS
-@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS                                    -*- outline -*-
- 
- * Noteworthy changes in release ?.? (????-??-??) [?]
- 
-+** Bug fixes
-+
-+  ls --color would mis-color relative-named symlinks in /
-+  [bug introduced in coreutils-8.17]
-+
- 
- * Noteworthy changes in release 8.17 (2012-05-10) [stable]
- 
-diff --git a/src/ls.c b/src/ls.c
-index 397e4ea..9494ae9 100644
---- a/src/ls.c
-+++ b/src/ls.c
-@@ -3213,7 +3213,14 @@ make_link_name (char const *name, char const *linkname)
-     return xstrdup (linkname);
- 
-   char *p = xmalloc (prefix_len + 1 + strlen (linkname) + 1);
--  stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len + 1), linkname);
-+
-+  /* PREFIX_LEN usually specifies a string not ending in slash.
-+     In that case, extend it by one, since the next byte *is* a slash.
-+     Otherwise, the prefix is "/", so leave the length unchanged.  */
-+  if ( ! ISSLASH (name[prefix_len - 1]))
-+    ++prefix_len;
-+
-+  stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len), linkname);
-   return p;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
-index a4370a6..0bafc5f 100644
---- a/tests/Makefile.am
-+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
-@@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ TESTS =						\
-   ls/proc-selinux-segfault			\
-   ls/readdir-mountpoint-inode			\
-   ls/recursive					\
-+  ls/root-rel-symlink-color			\
-   ls/rt-1					\
-   ls/slink-acl					\
-   ls/stat-dtype					\
-diff --git a/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color b/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color
-new file mode 100755
-index 0000000..d795432
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color
-@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
-+#!/bin/sh
-+# Exercise the 8.17 ls bug with coloring relative-named symlinks in "/".
-+
-+# Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-+
-+# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-+# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-+# (at your option) any later version.
-+
-+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-+# GNU General Public License for more details.
-+
-+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-+# along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-+
-+. "${srcdir=.}/init.sh"; path_prepend_ ../src
-+print_ver_ ls
-+
-+symlink_to_rel=
-+for i in /*; do
-+  # Skip non-symlinks:
-+  env test -h "$i" || continue
-+
-+  # Skip dangling symlinks:
-+  env test -e "$i" || continue
-+
-+  # Skip any symlink-to-absolute-name:
-+  case $(readlink "$i") in /*) continue ;; esac
-+
-+  symlink_to_rel=$i
-+  break
-+done
-+
-+test -z "$symlink_to_rel" \
-+  && skip_ no relative symlink in /
-+
-+e='\33'
-+color_code='01;36'
-+c_pre="$e[0m$e[${color_code}m"
-+c_post="$e[0m"
-+printf "$c_pre$symlink_to_rel$c_post\n" > exp || framework_failure_
-+
-+env TERM=xterm LS_COLORS="ln=$color_code:or=1;31;42" \
-+  ls -d --color=always "$symlink_to_rel" > out || fail=1
-+
-+compare exp out || fail=1
-+
-+Exit $fail
--- 
-1.7.11.2
-
diff --git a/abs/core/coreutils/PKGBUILD b/abs/core/coreutils/PKGBUILD
deleted file mode 100644
index f83225f..0000000
--- a/abs/core/coreutils/PKGBUILD
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-# $Id: PKGBUILD 163714 2012-07-18 02:16:52Z dreisner $
-# Maintainer: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
-# Contributor: judd <jvinet@zeroflux.org>
-
-pkgname=coreutils
-pkgver=8.17
-pkgrel=3
-pkgdesc="The basic file, shell and text manipulation utilities of the GNU operating system"
-arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
-license=('GPL3')
-url="http://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils"
-groups=('base')
-depends=('glibc' 'pam' 'acl' 'gmp' 'libcap')
-replaces=('mktemp')
-backup=('etc/pam.d/su')
-install=${pkgname}.install
-options=('!emptydirs')
-source=(ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz{,.sig}
-	coreutils-pam.patch
-	0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch
-	su.pam)
-md5sums=('bbda656ce8ca2c6903948f9faa204ba3'
-         'ebecd29b095aa21b0b2f833f1ec20d70'
-         'aad79a2aa6d566c375d7bdd1b0767278'
-         'd7c691898a695a6284a927e6a9426fe4'
-         'fa85e5cce5d723275b14365ba71a8aad')
-
-build() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-
-  # added su wheel group pam patch (from fedora git)
-  patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/coreutils-pam.patch
-
-  # fix coloring for symlinks in /
-  # upstream commit 6124a3842dfa8484b52e067a8ab8105c3875a4f7
-  patch -Np1 -i $srcdir/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch
-
-  autoreconf -v
-  ./configure --prefix=/usr --libexecdir=/usr/lib/coreutils \
-              --enable-install-program=su \
-              --enable-no-install-program=groups,hostname,kill,uptime \
-              --enable-pam
-  make
-}
-
-check() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-  make RUN_EXPENSIVE_TESTS=yes check
-}
-
-package() {
-  cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
-  make DESTDIR=${pkgdir} install
-
-  cd ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
-  install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/{bin,usr/sbin}
-
-  # binaries required by FHS
-  _fhs=('cat' 'chgrp' 'chmod' 'chown' 'cp' 'date' 'dd' 'df' 'echo' 'false'
-        'ln' 'ls' 'mkdir' 'mknod' 'mv' 'pwd' 'rm' 'rmdir' 'stty' 'su' 'sync'
-        'true' 'uname')
-  mv ${_fhs[@]} ${pkgdir}/bin
-
-  mv chroot ${pkgdir}/usr/sbin
-  install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/su.pam ${pkgdir}/etc/pam.d/su
-}
diff --git a/abs/core/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch b/abs/core/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e61908f..0000000
--- a/abs/core/coreutils/coreutils-pam.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,428 +0,0 @@
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac coreutils-8.4/configure.ac
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac	2010-01-11 18:20:42.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/configure.ac	2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -126,6 +126,13 @@ if test "$gl_gcc_warnings" = yes; then
-   AC_SUBST([GNULIB_WARN_CFLAGS])
- fi
- 
-+dnl Give the chance to enable PAM
-+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl
-+[  --enable-pam              Enable use of the PAM libraries],
-+[AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM])
-+LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
-+AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)])
-+
- AC_FUNC_FORK
- 
- optional_bin_progs=
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi	2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi	2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -15081,8 +15081,11 @@ to certain shells, etc.).
- @findex syslog
- @command{su} can optionally be compiled to use @code{syslog} to report
- failed, and optionally successful, @command{su} attempts.  (If the system
--supports @code{syslog}.)  However, GNU @command{su} does not check if the
--user is a member of the @code{wheel} group; see below.
-+supports @code{syslog}.)
-+
-+This version of @command{su} has support for using PAM for
-+authentication.  You can edit @file{/etc/pam.d/su} to customize its
-+behaviour.
- 
- The program accepts the following options.  Also see @ref{Common options}.
- 
-@@ -15124,6 +15127,8 @@ environment variables except @env{TERM},
- @env{PATH} to a compiled-in default value.  Change to @var{user}'s home
- directory.  Prepend @samp{-} to the shell's name, intended to make it
- read its login startup file(s).
-+Additionaly @env{DISPLAY} and @env{XAUTHORITY} environment variables 
-+are preserved as well for PAM functionality.
- 
- @item -m
- @itemx -p
-@@ -15163,33 +15168,6 @@ Exit status:
- the exit status of the subshell otherwise
- @end display
- 
--@cindex wheel group, not supported
--@cindex group wheel, not supported
--@cindex fascism
--@subsection Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group
--
--(This section is by Richard Stallman.)
--
--@cindex Twenex
--@cindex MIT AI lab
--Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the
--rest.  For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to
--seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and
--keeping it secret from everyone else.  (I was able to thwart this coup
--and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I
--wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.)
--
--However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone.  Under the usual
--@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who
--sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest.  The
--``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the
--power of the rulers.
--
--I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers.  If you are
--used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you
--might find this idea strange at first.
--
--
- @node timeout invocation
- @section @command{timeout}: Run a command with a time limit
- 
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am	2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am	2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ factor_LDADD += $(LIB_GMP)
- uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
- 
- # for crypt
--su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT)
-+su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) @LIB_PAM@
- 
- # for various ACL functions
- copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c coreutils-8.4/src/su.c
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c	2010-02-12 10:15:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/src/su.c	2010-02-12 10:24:29.000000000 +0100
-@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
-    restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts.  RMS considers that to
-    be fascist.
- 
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+
-+   Actually, with PAM, su has nothing to do with whether or not a
-+   wheel group is enforced by su.  RMS tries to restrict your access
-+   to a su which implements the wheel group, but PAM considers that
-+   to be fascist, and gives the user/sysadmin the opportunity to
-+   enforce a wheel group by proper editing of /etc/pam.conf
-+
-+#endif
-+
-    Compile-time options:
-    -DSYSLOG_SUCCESS	Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
-    -DSYSLOG_FAILURE	Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
-@@ -53,6 +63,15 @@
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <grp.h>
- 
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+# include <signal.h>
-+# include <sys/wait.h>
-+# include <sys/fsuid.h>
-+# include <unistd.h>
-+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
-+# include <security/pam_misc.h>
-+#endif /* USE_PAM */
-+
- #include "system.h"
- #include "getpass.h"
- 
-@@ -120,10 +139,17 @@
- /* The user to become if none is specified.  */
- #define DEFAULT_USER "root"
- 
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
- char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt);
-+#endif
- 
--static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t)
-+static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t,
-+	const struct passwd *)
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+	;
-+#else
-      ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN;
-+#endif
- 
- /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell.  */
- static bool fast_startup;
-@@ -209,7 +235,26 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
- }
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+static int retval;
-+static struct pam_conv conv = {
-+  misc_conv,
-+  NULL
-+};
-+
-+#define PAM_BAIL_P if (retval) { \
-+  pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
-+  return 0; \
-+}
-+#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) {		\
-+  pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);			\
-+return;						\
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Ask the user for a password.
-+   If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary.
-    Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
-    false if not.  Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
-    or if PW has an empty password.  */
-@@ -217,6 +262,44 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
- static bool
- correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
- {
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+  struct passwd *caller;
-+  char *tty_name, *ttyn;
-+  retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
-+  PAM_BAIL_P;
-+
-+  if (getuid() != 0 && !isatty(0)) {
-+	fprintf(stderr, "standard in must be a tty\n");
-+	exit(1);
-+  }
-+
-+  caller = getpwuid(getuid());
-+  if(caller != NULL && caller->pw_name != NULL) {
-+	  retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller->pw_name);
-+	  PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  }
-+
-+  ttyn = ttyname(0);
-+  if (ttyn) {
-+    if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
-+       tty_name = ttyn+5;
-+    else
-+       tty_name = ttyn;
-+    retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
-+    PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  }
-+  retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
-+  PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
-+  if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
-+    /* password has expired.  Offer option to change it. */
-+    retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
-+    PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  }
-+  PAM_BAIL_P;
-+  /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */
-+  return 1;
-+#else /* !USE_PAM */
-   char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
- #if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
-   /* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems.  */
-@@ -241,6 +324,7 @@ correct_password (const struct passwd *p
-   encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
-   memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
-   return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
-+#endif /* !USE_PAM */
- }
- 
- /* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
-@@ -254,12 +338,18 @@ modify_environment (const struct passwd 
-       /* Leave TERM unchanged.  Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
-          Unset all other environment variables.  */
-       char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
-+      char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
-+      char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
-       if (term)
-         term = xstrdup (term);
-       environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *));
-       environ[0] = NULL;
-       if (term)
-         xsetenv ("TERM", term);
-+      if (display)
-+        xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
-+      if (xauthority)
-+        xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
-       xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
-       xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
-       xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
-@@ -292,8 +382,13 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
- {
- #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
-   errno = 0;
--  if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
-+  if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+    pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+    pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
-+#endif
-     error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
-+  }
-   endgrent ();
- #endif
-   if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
-@@ -302,6 +397,31 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
-     error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
- }
- 
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int caught=0;
-+/* Signal handler for parent process later */
-+static void su_catch_sig(int sig)
-+{
-+  ++caught;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+pam_copyenv (pam_handle_t *pamh)
-+{
-+  char **env;
-+
-+  env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
-+  if(env) {
-+    while(*env) {
-+	if (putenv (*env))
-+	  xalloc_die ();
-+	env++;
-+    }
-+  }
-+  return(0);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
-    If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
-    Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
-@@ -309,17 +429,49 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
- 
- static void
- run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
--           size_t n_additional_args)
-+           size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
- {
-   size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1;
-   char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args);
-   size_t argno = 1;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+  int child;
-+  sigset_t ourset;
-+  int status;
-+
-+  retval = pam_open_session(pamh,0);
-+  if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+    fprintf (stderr, "could not open session\n");
-+    exit (1);
-+  }
-+
-+/* do this at the last possible moment, because environment variables may
-+   be passed even in the session phase
-+*/
-+  if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS)
-+     fprintf (stderr, "error copying PAM environment\n");
-+  
-+  /* Credentials should be set in the parent */ 
-+  if (pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+    pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+    fprintf(stderr, "could not set PAM credentials\n");
-+    exit(1);
-+  }
-+
-+  child = fork();
-+  if (child == 0) {  /* child shell */
-+  change_identity (pw);
-+  pam_end(pamh, 0);
-+#endif
- 
-   if (simulate_login)
-     {
-       char *arg0;
-       char *shell_basename;
- 
-+      if(chdir(pw->pw_dir))
-+	      error(0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
-+
-       shell_basename = last_component (shell);
-       arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
-       arg0[0] = '-';
-@@ -344,6 +496,67 @@ run_shell (char const *shell, char const
-     error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
-     exit (exit_status);
-   }
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+  } else if (child == -1) {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "can not fork user shell: %s", strerror(errno));
-+      pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
-+      pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+      pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
-+      exit(1);
-+  }
-+  /* parent only */
-+  sigfillset(&ourset);
-+  if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
-+    fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
-+    caught = 1;
-+  }
-+  if (!caught) {
-+    struct sigaction action;
-+    action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig;
-+    sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask);
-+    action.sa_flags = 0;
-+    sigemptyset(&ourset);
-+    if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM)
-+        || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM)
-+        || sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL)
-+        || sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal masking malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
-+      caught = 1;
-+    }
-+  }
-+  if (!caught) {
-+    do {
-+      int pid;
-+
-+      pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED);
-+
-+      if (((pid_t)-1 != pid) && (0 != WIFSTOPPED (status))) {
-+          kill(getpid(), WSTOPSIG(status));
-+          /* once we get here, we must have resumed */
-+          kill(pid, SIGCONT);
-+      }
-+    } while (0 != WIFSTOPPED(status));
-+  }
-+
-+  if (caught) {
-+    fprintf(stderr, "\nSession terminated, killing shell...");
-+    kill (child, SIGTERM);
-+  }
-+  /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */
-+  pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
-+  retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+  PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
-+  retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+  PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
-+  if (caught) {
-+    sleep(2);
-+    kill(child, SIGKILL);
-+    fprintf(stderr, " ...killed.\n");
-+    exit(-1);
-+  }
-+  exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (status)) ? WEXITSTATUS (status)
-+                                  : WTERMSIG (status) + 128);
-+#endif /* USE_PAM */
- }
- 
- /* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
-@@ -511,9 +724,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
-   shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
-   modify_environment (pw, shell);
- 
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
-   change_identity (pw);
--  if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0)
--    error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
-+#endif
- 
-   /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure.
-      Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of
-@@ -523,5 +736,5 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
-   if (ferror (stderr))
-     exit (EXIT_CANCELED);
- 
--  run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind));
-+  run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw);
- }
diff --git a/abs/core/coreutils/coreutils.install b/abs/core/coreutils/coreutils.install
deleted file mode 100644
index 8caae66..0000000
--- a/abs/core/coreutils/coreutils.install
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-infodir=usr/share/info
-filelist=(coreutils.info)
-
-post_install() {
- [ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0
- for file in ${filelist[@]}; do
-    usr/bin/install-info $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
- done
-}
-
-post_upgrade() {
-  post_install $1
-}
-
-pre_remove() {
- [ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0
-  for file in ${filelist[@]}; do
-    usr/bin/install-info --delete $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
-  done
-}
-
diff --git a/abs/core/coreutils/su.pam b/abs/core/coreutils/su.pam
deleted file mode 100644
index cf15f40..0000000
--- a/abs/core/coreutils/su.pam
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#%PAM-1.0
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-# Uncomment the following line to implicitly trust users in the "wheel" group.
-#auth		sufficient	pam_wheel.so trust use_uid
-# Uncomment the following line to require a user to be in the "wheel" group.
-#auth		required	pam_wheel.so use_uid
-auth		required	pam_unix.so
-account		required	pam_unix.so
-session		required	pam_unix.so